Introduction
"It takes 20 years to build a reputation and five minutes to ruin it. If you think about that, you'll do things differently."
-Warren Buffett
At one end of the spectrum are the Warren Buffetts and Cynthia Cooper (Cynthia Cooper was the whistle-blower at WorldCom) while at the other end are Enrons and WorldComs.
Interestingly enough, the final disintegration of Arthur Andersen (one of Big Five Accounting firms) was not caused directly by Enron audit deficiencies, but by a decision to shred Enron audit documents, and the conviction on the charge of obstruction of justice that resulted. The ensuing loss of reputation meant Arthur Andersen's clients walked away, and even though on May 31 st , 2005, the U.S. supreme Court overturned the conviction on the grounds that the "jury instructions failed to convey the requisite consciousness of wrong-doing", it was too late -a firm of 85,000 people worldwide, including 24,000 in the US had disintegrated. This example underscores the importance of reputation in a world characterized by information asymmetry.
The role information plays in facilitating reputation for trustworthiness is the focus of this paper. This paper first analyzes an economy where there is information asymmetry between an investor and a manager and the only reputation-building tool available to the manager is the dividend she pays out. The information asymmetry arises from an uncertain state of nature, the realization of which is the manager's private information. In the equilibrium of a finitely repeated game, a rational manager will pay dividends consistent with the lower possible state of nature having occurred, if the investor's prior beliefs about the manager's trustworthiness are sufficiently high. Lack of ex post verifiability of the state of nature implies that the manager is able to get away with pretending that the lower possible state of nature has occurred; however, this leads to a downward revision of the investor's ex ante beliefs about the manager's trustworthiness. Given that the investor's beliefs about the manager's trustworthiness are high, therefore, she will invest with certainty. That is, the equilibrium will be in pure strategies.
If the investor's prior beliefs about the manager's trustworthiness are not sufficiently high, then the equilibrium will be in mixed strategies. The investor will invest with a certain probability strictly less than one while the manager will pay dividend with a certain probability strictly less than one. The choice of respective probabilities will be such that it will make the other agent indifferent between the choices available to her in her action space. While pure strategy play leads to downward revision of the investor's beliefs about the manager's trustworthiness, mixed strategy play ensures that the investor's prior / ex ante beliefs about the manager's trustworthiness are updated upwards to a point at which the investor then invests with a probability strictly less than one.
The paper then compares such a dividend-only economy with one where sharing of private information is an additional reputation-building tool available to the manager. It finds that in equilibrium, the dividend-only economy will have a smaller region of pure strategy play compared to the dividend-and-information-sharing economy. Pure strategy region in both the economies has the investor investing with certainty while the mixed strategy region has the investor investing with a certain probability strictly less than one. Greater region of pure strategy play in the dividend-and-information-sharing economy and the concomitant investment with certainty will lead to higher investment in information sharing.
The pure strategy region in the dividend-only economy has the manager paying out a dividend consistent with the lower state of nature having occurred. On the other hand, the pure strategy region of the dividend-and-information-sharing economy introduces the possibility of sharing manager's private information about the realized state of nature. It, thereby, obviates such obfuscation by the manager as is possible in the dividend-only economy. Further, as noted earlier, there is greater region of pure strategy play in the dividend-and-information-sharing economy. Taken together, the greater region of mixed strategy play combined with pure strategy play of payment of dividend consistent with the lower state of nature in the dividend-only economy leads to higher return in information sharing.
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Fundamental to the above analysis is the existence of trustworthy manager. In the dividendonly economy, the trustworthy manager is defined as one that always pays a fair dividend to the investor. In the dividend-and-information-sharing economy, the corresponding definition is of a manager that pays a fair dividend and chooses to share her private information. The finitely repeated nature of the game allows for opportunities for reputation building in both the economies. While the payoff maximizing nature of the rational manager pushes her towards paying out as little as possible in dividends, the possible existence of the trustworthy manager forces egalitarianism. In equilibrium, the rational manager is forced to mimic the trustworthy type in an attempt to build reputation for being trustworthy. The nature of such mimicking is different across the two economies with the resultant differences in investment and return.
This paper is closely related to Einhorn and Ziv (2008) and Beyer and Dye (2012) . Einhorn and Ziv (2008) shows that current period's disclosure impacts the firm's reputation for being informationally endowed by increasing the market's expectation of information endowment of the firm and thus, creates an implicit disclosure cost for future. Beyer and Dye (2012) studies managerial efforts at building reputation for being 'forthcoming' by disclosing all the earnings forecast received in the classic Dye (1985) and Jung and Kwon (1988) voluntary disclosure framework.
In the current study, the counterpart of Beyer and Dye's 'forthcoming' manager is the 'trustworthy' manager. In the literature following Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995) , 'trust' is widely perceived as making the risky choice of passing the endowment to the second player in a sequential game for an expanded pie, some of which may be possibly returned. This paper follows such notion of trust in studying the managerial efforts at building reputation for being trustworthy. While trust has mostly been examined using behavioral theories and human subjects experiments, at a theoretical level, trust has been conceptualized as a strategic attempt to build reputation in a repeated game (e.g. ; Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts and Wilson (1982) ). This paper allows for information asymmetry in a reputation-building model to examine the role of information sharing in building reputation for being trustworthy. Another paper that allows for 6 information asymmetry in a reputation-building model is Lunawat (2013a) . While Lunawat (2013a) establishes information sharing as a reputation building tool, the current paper focuses on differences in reputation building opportunities, in investment and in return across dividend-only and dividend-and-information-sharing economies.
This paper is also related to the repeated cheap-talk models that address reputation concerns pertaining to disclosure of private information. In these models, there is value to truthful disclosures because there is the possibility of untruthful disclosures and hence, a rational agent tries to develop reputation for making truthful disclosures. Sobel (1985) shows improvement in communication flowing from managerial efforts at building a reputation for truthful disclosure. While the cheap-talk models allow for the possibility of untruthful disclosure, I follow the Grossman (1981) and Milgrom (1981) approach of requiring disclosure / information sharing to be truthful. Dispensation of the possibility of untruthful disclosures is consistent with existence of a fairly strong legal and regulatory framework and also allows veering the focus from managerial efforts at building a reputation for truthful disclosures to managerial efforts at building a reputation for being trustworthy.
This paper contributes to the extant literature on investor protection and dividend policies by formalizing managerial reputation-building as the force that drives dividend payment.
Holding a firm's investment policy constant, dividend payouts reduce the firm's retained earnings, thereby leaving shareholder wealth unchanged (Modigliani and Miller (1958) ).
Therefore, it is puzzling that firms still choose to pay dividends. A possible explanation is that firms signal future growth by paying dividends so that firms that pay dividends 7 experience higher future growth while those that do not pay dividends experience lower future growth (e.g. Bhattacharya (1979) ). However, this explanation has mixed empirical support (e.g. Aharony and Swary (1980), DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner (1996) and Benartzi, Michaely and Thaler (1997) ). Another explanation is rooted in the agency theory (e.g. Jensen (1986) , Hart and Moore (1974) ). According to this, investor preference for dividends over retained earnings arises from the potential of managerial / insider expropriation of retained earnings. This explanation has found support in both empirical (LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (2000) ) and experimental (LaRiviere, McMahon and Neilsen (2016) ) work. This paper puts forth managerial reputation building as an alternative explanation for dividend payment. Lunawat (2013b) provides experimental evidence supporting the equilibrium behavior derived in the current paper.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the model of the dividendonly economy. Section 3 defines and characterizes the equilibrium of the model. Section 4 discusses the dividend-and-informing-sharing economy. Section 5 compares the investment and return in the two economies. Section 6 summarizes and concludes.
Model
This section develops the model of the dividend-only economy. There are two players, a sender / investor and a receiver / manager 1 . Nature moves first and selects the manager's type to be either trustworthy or untrustworthy. I will define momentarily what I mean by each type. The manager knows her type but the investor does not. The game then proceeds through 2 periods in each of which the investor and the manager make a sequence of
choices. In what follows, the subscript t (t = 1, 2) will be used to denote a period.
1 The sender-receiver game I define derives from the "investment game" first studied experimentally in Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe, 1995. In this investment game a sender is endowed with 10 units of wealth and decides how much of this endowment to send to a receiver. The amount sent by the sender is tripled before it reaches the receiver. The receiver decides how much of this tripled amount to keep and how much to send back.
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The investor is endowed with e > 0 units of wealth and chooses whether to invest in the manager. Regardless of whether the investor chooses to invest, e is common knowledge.
That is, both the investor and the manager know the amount of wealth the investor is endowed with. The investor's decision to invest is denoted by ND t m = e and the investor's decision not to invest is denoted by ND t m = 0. If the investor chooses to invest, then the amount e is multiplied by a multiplier λt before the manager receives it. λt  {l, h} and is equally likely to be either l or h in every period. Assume 1 ≤ l < 2 < h, l + h > 4. It is as if the manager has some production technology because of which she is able to grow the investment of e to et. The multiplied amount (eλt) may be thought of as the gross income of the firm comprising the investor and the manager. I will explain momentarily the 
). An untrustworthy manager is defined as a manager that is not trustworthy. I have l / 2 < 1 so that a realization λt = l implies a negative net return for investor, h / 2 > 1 so that a realization λt = h implies a positive net return for investor, and 9 (l + h) / 4 > 1 so that the expected net return for investor, if manager is trustworthy, is positive. Risk neutrality, additively separable utility and no time discounting are assumed. Figure 1 describes the timeline of the dividend-only economy.
Figure 1 -Timeline of the Dividend-only Economy
Repeat for 2 periods
Repeat for 2 periods Nature chooses the manager's type to be trustworthy or untrustworthy.
Untrustworthy manager
The investor is endowed with e units of wealth and chooses whether to invest.
If the investor chooses to invest, then the manager receives et where t{l, h}, chooses to return to the investor and keeps the residual et -
The investor receives but never learns t.
Trustworthy manager
If the investor chooses to invest, then the manager receives et where t{l, h}, chooses to return to the investor and keeps the residual et -.
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Equilibrium
A perfect Bayesian equilibrium of this game is defined as follows. An equilibrium comprises a strategy for each player and for each period t a function ND t P that takes the history of moves up to period t into numbers in [0 , 1] such that :
Starting from any point in the game where it is the manager's move, the manager's strategy is a best response to the investor's strategy.
(ii) Starting from any point in the game where it is the investor's move, the investor's strategy is a best response to the manager's strategy given that the investor believes with probability ) ( t ND t h P that the manager is trustworthy.
(iii) The game begins with . ND t P is the probability with which the investor believes the manager is trustworthy. In the beginning of period 1, the investor believes with probability  that the manager is Now, I will describe the strategies of the investor and the untrustworthy manager in terms of .
ND t P
The investor's strategy may be outlined as:
, the investor invests in period 1 ( An untrustworthy manager's strategy depends on t and ND t P . The strategy may be outlined as: 
The untrustworthy / rational manager chooses to return nothing as dividend in the last period (Point M(i) above) because the alternative of paying a non-zero dividend is personally costly to her and since it is the last period, there are no associated expected future benefits. Consider the case where
. The investor's beliefs about a manager's trustworthiness are so high that the latter can get away with pretending that the lower possible state of nature has occurred. That is, the manager pays 2 / el as dividend, thereby implying that the lower state of nature occurred (Point M(ii) above).
The intuition behind why the manager is able to get away with such pretense is the following. Even though the investor revises her posterior beliefs downwards, the prior is so high that the posterior remains at or above the investment threshold for period 2. To see this more clearly, note that since
by I(i), the investor invests in period 1. By M(ii), the manager returns a non-zero amount
and by I(ii) -I(iv), the investor invests with non-zero probability in period 2.
Points M(iii) and M(iv) talk about the case where the investor's beliefs about the manager's trustworthiness are not so high. Then, the manager's best response is in mixed strategies.
If the lower state of nature occurs (that is,
, then with probability ND S 3 , the manager chooses to pay a dividend consistent with the lower state of nature having occurred and with complementary probability pays a dividend of zero. That is, with probability ND S 3 , she mimics to be a trustworthy type (Point M(iii) . 
ND ND SS 
Proposition 1. The strategies (I(i) -I(iii), M(i) -M(iv)) and beliefs (B(i) -B(v)) described
above constitute a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Proof in Appendix.
Dividend-and-Information Sharing Economy
4.1 Model. Consider the earlier game with the following modification. The manager makes an information sharing decision before the investor makes an investment decision. The manager chooses whether to share private information she will learn in the course of the game. A decision to share private information is denoted by dt = 1 and a decision not to share private information is denoted by dt = 0. Note that the manager is not privy to the private information at the time she makes the choice of whether to share it. It is information she will learn in the course of the game.
The investor sees the manager's information sharing decision, is endowed with e > 0 units of wealth and then makes the investment decision. The investor's decision to invest is denoted by D t m = e and the investor's decision not to invest is denoted by D t m = 0. As before, if the investor chooses to invest, then the amount e is multiplied by a multiplier λt before the manager receives it. λt  {l, h} and is equally likely to be either l or h in every period. Assume 1 ≤ l < 2 < h, l + h > 4. Now the manager receives et and learns t.
However, the investor learns λt only if the manager had chosen to share her private information. In this sense, λt is the manager's private information -she always learns the realized value of λt, but the investor's knowledge of λt is dependent on the manager's information sharing decision.
After the manager receives et, she chooses to send back
In this economy, a trustworthy manager is defined as one that always chooses to share her private information (dt = 1) and always chooses to return returns half of what she receives (That is, if t = l, she chooses
2 and if t = h, she chooses
). An untrustworthy manager is defined as a manager that is not trustworthy. As before, risk neutrality, additively separable utility and no time discounting are assumed. The modified timeline may be described as in Figures 2.
Figure 2 -Timeline of the Dividend-and-Information-Sharing Economy
The manager chooses to share private information that she will learn in course of the game. 
The investor receives and learns t if the manager had earlier chosen to share her private information.
Repeat for 2 periods Nature chooses the manager's type to be trustworthy or untrustworthy. 
If the investor invests in period 1 (m1 = e) but the manager either does not share her private information in period 2 or the manager does not return half of what she receives in period 1, (
.
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Note that the updating rule (Point B'(iii) above) here is different from the corresponding rule in the dividend-only economy because no downward revision of beliefs occurs in this dividend-and-information-sharing economy.
Now, I will describe the strategies of the investor and the untrustworthy manager in terms of D t P . The investor's strategy may be outlined as: The investor continues to follow the threshold strategy. Further, the investment threshold for periods 1 and 2 in this dividend-and-information-sharing economy (Points I'(i) and I'(ii) above) are identical to the respective thresholds in the dividend-only economy.
However, unlike the dividend-only economy, the investor's best response in the mixed strategy region is not dependent on the dividend 
, the manager chooses to share her private information in period 2 and chooses to return half of what she receives in period 1 (
, then with a probability
, the manager returns half of what she receives in period 1. With probability
, the manager does not return anything in period 1. In the instance where the manager returns half of what she receives in period 1, she chooses to share her private information in period 2.
That is, with a probability The strategies and beliefs described above constitute a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. This follows from the equilibrium of the n period version of this game, which is derived in Lunawat (2013a) . The investor's and the manager's best responses across the dividendonly and the dividend-and-information-sharing economies are summarized in Table 1 .
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Case 1:
The investor invests with certainty in period 1 in both economies. The investor invests in period 2 with certainty in the dividend-andinformation-sharing economy. However, in the dividend-only economy, she invests in period 2 with a certain probability () 1.
, Manager returns with
The untrustworthy manager returns half of what she receives as dividend in period 1 in the dividend-and-information-sharing economy. However, in the dividend-only economy, she returns a strictly positive dividend in period 1 with a certain probability () 1.
The untrustworthy manager does not return anything in period 2 in both economies. Case 3:
The investor invests in period 1 with certainty in both economies.
Investor invests with
Investor invests with probability ND V () In the dividend-and-information-sharing economy, the investor invests in period 2 with a certain probability 2 1. D V  In the dividend-only economy, the investor invests in period 2 with a certain probability () 1.
ND V 
Manager returns with
Manager returns with probability ND S () In the dividend-and-information-sharing economy, the untrustworthy manager returns a strictly positive dividend in period 1 with a certain probability 1 1.
D
S  In the dividend-only economy, the untrustworthy manager returns a strictly positive dividend in period 1 with a certain probability () 1.
The untrustworthy manager does not return anything in period 2 in both economies. Case 4:
The investor does not invest anything in period 1 in both economies. The untrustworthy manager does not return anything in period 2 in both economies. 
is a zero probability event in the dividend-and-information-sharing economy. Further, the probability that 2 / () 1 el k  in the dividend-only economy is not higher than the probability that 2 / Note that while in the dividend-and-information-sharing economy, the probability of return Then, the investor will invest probability 1 in both periods 1 and 2 in the dividend-andinformation-sharing economy since 2 2 1 0 4 / ( ) (4 / ( )) .
In the dividend-only economy, the investor will invest with probability 1 in period 1 since 2 1 4 / ( ) (4 / ( )) . 
, the investor will invest in periods 1 and 2 in both the dividend-andinformation-sharing and the dividend-only economies. Note that in the dividend-andinformation-sharing economy, the threshold for maximum investment to occur is ) /( 4 h l  while in the dividend-only economy, the threshold for maximum investment to occur is
. Similarly, the thresholds for maximum return to occur are different. This difference in thresholds will lead to higher expected investment and expected return in dividend-and-information-sharing economy. This is derived formally next.
Investment Across the Two Economies. Proposition 2 below states the conditions
under which the expected investment in the dividend-and-information-sharing economy is at least as much as in the dividend-only economy and the conditions under which the expected investment in the dividend-and-information-sharing economy is greater than that in the dividend-only economy.
Proposition
2.
In general, ) ( ) (
Proof. There are four cases to consider. First, ).
And,
ND ND l h P P  11 / (2 ) 4 / ( ).
That is, in both the dividend-and-information-sharing and the dividend-only economies, the investor's beliefs about the manager's trustworthiness are above the investment threshold for period 2 and therefore, the investor invests with probability 1 in period 2. Further,
. That is, in both the economies, the investor's beliefs about the manager's trustworthiness are above the investment threshold for period 1 and therefore, the investor invests in period 1, too. This implies
the dividend-and-information-sharing economy, the investor invests with probability 1 in period 2, but in the dividend-only economy, investor invests with probability () ND V in period 2. Since
, investor invests in period 1 in both economies. This implies 1 1
Therefore, in the dividend-andinformation-sharing economy, the investor invests with probability 
Therefore, the investor does not invest in period 1 in either economy. Since ) 
The proof of Proposition 2 hinges on the differences in period 2 investment across the two economies. Figure 3 summarizes this period 2 investment across the two economies under different priors. The four different regions or intervals in which the priors fall are shown on the number line. Then, for each of the four intervals, the table compares the expected total investment, the probability of investing in period 2 and the posterior probability across the two economies. The first column of the table states the case where investment does not occur in either economy. The second column states the case where investment occurs with a certain probability strictly less than one in both the economies. In the third column, the priors are at a point where investment occurs with certainty in the dividend-andinformation-sharing economy but occurs with a probability strictly less than one in the dividend-only economy. The fourth column states the case where the priors are so high that investment occurs with certainty in both the economies. 
Figure 3 -Comparing Investment Across the Dividend-only and the Dividend-andInformation-Sharing Economies
Notes to Figure 3 : In the second row titled 'Probability of Investing in Period 2', the first number in each of the cells shows the probability with which the investor invests in period 2 in the dividend-and-informationsharing economy while the second number in each of the cells shows the probability with which the investor invests in period 2 in the dividend-only economy. ) and therefore, in comparing the return across the two economies, I will focus on period 1 return only. Proposition 3 below states the conditions under which the period 1 expected return from an untrustworthy manager in the dividendand-information-sharing economy is at least as much as in the dividend-only economy and the conditions under which the period 1 expected return from an untrustworthy in the dividend-and-information-sharing economy is greater than that in the dividend-only economy.
Return
Proposition 3. In general, ) ( ) ( 
, therefore manager returns with probability () .
, therefore manager returns with
, therefore manager returns with Then, for each of the three intervals, the table compares the total expected return, the amount of return and the probability of return across the two economies. The first column describes the case where mixed strategy occurs in both the economies. The second column describes the case where pure strategy play occurs in the dividend-and-information-sharing economy but mixed strategy play occurs in the dividend-only economy. The third column states the case where pure strategy play occurs in both the economies. Note that in the dividend-and-information-sharing economy, pure strategy play implies that the rational / untrustworthy manager returns half of what she receives as dividend to the investor. But in the dividend-only economy, pure strategy play implies that the rational / untrustworthy manager returns a dividend consistent with the lower state of nature having occurred.
Total Expected
Return from an Untrustworthy Manager the prior probability falls, the table compares the posterior probability, the expected total investment and the period 1 expected return from an untrustworthy manager across the two economies.
The first column of the table describes the case where the prior probability is in the subinterval (0.67, 0.8). In the dividend-and-information-sharing economy, the posterior probability is equal to the prior probability. This probability is above the investment threshold for both periods 1 and 2. Since the investor's beliefs about the manager's trustworthiness are above the investment threshold for both periods 1 and 2, therefore, the investor invests with certainty in both periods. This makes the expected total investment equal 20. The untrustworthy manager returns half of what she receives in period 1 and this implies that the expected total return from an untrustworthy manager is 15. Now, consider the dividend-only economy. The posterior belief gets revised downward to 0.67. This figure of 0.67 is exactly the investment threshold for period 2. Now, the investor's period 1 beliefs about the manager's trustworthiness are above the investment threshold for period 1 but the period 2 beliefs are exactly on the investment threshold.
Therefore, the investor invests with certainty in period 1 but invests with a certain probability strictly less than 1 in period 2. This makes the expected total investment less than 20. The untrustworthy manager mimics to be a trustworthy type but such mimicking occurs with a certain probability strictly less than 1. This implies that the expected total return from an untrustworthy manager is less than 15. Note that while the equilibrium in the dividend-and-information-sharing economy is in pure strategies, the equilibrium in the dividend-only economy is in mixed strategies.
The second column of the table describes the case where the prior probability is in the subinterval (0.8, 0.1). In the dividend-and-information-sharing economy, the posterior probability is equal to the prior probability. This probability is above the investment threshold for both periods 1 and 2; and therefore, the investor invests in both periods. This makes the expected total investment equal 20. The untrustworthy manager returns half of what she receives in period 1 and this implies that the expected total return from an untrustworthy manager is equal to 15. Now, consider the dividend-only economy. The posterior belief gets revised downward. However, even with such downward revision, the posterior belief remains above the period 2 investment threshold of 0.67. Since the investor's beliefs about the manager's trustworthiness are above the investment threshold for both periods 1 and 2, therefore, the investor invests in both periods. This makes the expected total investment equal 20. In period 1, the untrustworthy manager returns a dividend consistent with the lower possible state of nature having occurred. This implies that the expected total return from an untrustworthy manager is 5. Note that while the equilibrium in both economies is in pure strategies, the period 1 expected return from an untrustworthy manager is lower in the dividend-only economy.
Posterior Probability The key here is that when prior probability is high but not very high (more specifically, it is between 0.67 and 0.8), the posterior probability in the dividend-and-information-sharing economy remains above the investment threshold for period 2 while the posterior probability in the dividend-only economy is exactly at investment threshold for period 2.
Therefore, the equilibrium is in pure strategies in the dividend-and information-sharing economy while it is in mixed strategies in the dividend-only economy. Pure strategy play implies investment with certainty while mixed strategy implies investment with a certain probability strictly less than one. This leads to maximum possible expected investment in the dividend-and-information-sharing economy while the expected investment in the dividend-only economy is strictly less than the maximum possible of 20. Similarly, pure strategy play in the dividend-and-information-sharing economy implies that first-period return consistent with the actual state of nature occurs with certainty while mixed strategy play in the dividend-and-information-sharing economy implies that first-period return consistent with the actual state of nature occurs with a certain probability strictly less than one. This leads to higher return in information-sharing.
When the probability is very high (more specifically, it is higher than 0.8), the posterior probability in both the economies remains above the investment threshold for period 2.
Therefore, equilibrium is in pure strategies in both the economies. As such pure strategy play implies investment with certainty, expected investment in both economies is equal to the maximum possible of 20. Now, pure strategy play implies a first-period return consistent with the actual state of nature in the dividend-and-information-sharing economy while it implies a first-period return consistent with the lower state of nature in the dividend-only economy. This leads to lower expected return in the dividend-only economy. 
Conclusion
This paper shows that information-sharing and the concomitant credibility allow for a greater region of indiscriminate mimicking of the trustworthy managers by the untrustworthy / rational ones. In this sense, the institution of information sharing provides reputation building opportunities over and above those provided by the institution of dividend payment. Characteristic features of the region of perfect mimicking are higher probability of investment and higher probability of high returns on investment. By allowing Prior Probability 0.67 32 for a greater region of perfect mimicking, information sharing results in greater investormanager trust, higher investment, and higher return.
In accounting practice, there are several instances of managers providing information voluntarily with the evident purport of building a reputation amongst investors. This paper, while confirming such anecdotal behavior, provides the strategic basis for it. In this paper, the implications for practice emerge from how such voluntary information sharing provides greater opportunities at the building of trust and trustworthiness and how greater trust translates into greater investment and return.
There is increasing demand for enhancing the granularity of public disclosure. should be disclosed at a firm-specific level or an industry level. Taken to the limit, firmspecific disclosures and granular information are analogous to the dividend-andinformation-sharing economy while industry-level disclosures and coarse information are analogous to the dividend-only economy. This paper suggests that reputation and trust are important components that need to be considered in such debates.
Given the complicated nature of the equilibrium described in this paper, it is natural to ask whether people actually behave as predicted and whether such behavior results in higher investments and returns in the dividend-and-information-sharing economy compared to the dividend-only economy. I ran a human subjects experiment and found support for the equilibrium behavior predicted here (Lunawat (2013b) ). After controlling for prior beliefs, I also found support for higher investment in information sharing.
This paper analyzes a setting where the manager always learns the true state of nature. An interesting extension could modify the setting to one where the manager does not learn the state of nature perfectly and instead receives only a noisy signal of the state of nature. This will allow an examination of how the reputation effects change as the precision of the 33 manager's private information increases. Another possible extension would be one where the manager receives a perfect signal about the state of nature but the probability that she receives such a signal is strictly less than one so that the investor is unsure about the manager's endowment of private information. This will allow an analysis of how strategic considerations about managerial reputation building interact with investor uncertainty about manager's endowment of private information.
Future work could also look at modifying this setting to incorporate differences in managerial talent. One way to model differences in managerial talent could be to define a manager with higher ability as one that has a relatively higher probability of getting a higher state of nature. Another way to model differences in managerial talent could be the following: the manager receives a perfect signal about the state of nature but the probability that she receives such a signal is strictly less than one. Then, a manager with higher ability could be defined as one that has a relatively higher probability of being informed.
Regardless of whether differences in managerial talent is modeled as differences in access to better technology or as differences in access to better information, it will shed light on interaction between managerial efforts at reputation building and differences in managerial talent. This completes the proof that the set of beliefs and strategies described earlier constitutes a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
